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1. Introduction: Things We Lost in the Fire
It is undeniable that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
European Union (EU) represents the most significant institutional challenge for 
the European project to this date. Such a challenge is felt at different levels and 
has been at the centre of attentions of the legal community. In this context, the 
focus has so far been put on the difficulties posed by the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements underlying the triggering of Article 50 TEU1. The famous Miller2 
litigation has worked as an important test tube to understand the nature of the 
“decision to withdraw from the Union in accordance with [the withdrawing state] 
constitutional requirements” mentioned in Article 50(1) TEU. This is, however, 
mostly an internal matter that must be settled by each Member State who even-
tually decides to leave.
From the standpoint of EU law, scholars have here and there questioned 
the scope of withdrawal and its impact on the nature of the EU legal order. It is 
feared that Brexit radically changes the nature of European integration in so far 
as it demonstrates that the EU project is not definitive and can be reverted3. In 
this context, attention has been drawn to what Europe has lost with the trigger-
ing of Article 50 TEU. 
In reality, despite the fact that it was generally expected that Article 50 TEU 
would never be implemented in practice, from a conceptual point of view, its 
mere presence in the Treaties is generally considered to be a manifestation of 
the intergovernmental dimension underlying to EU cooperation, contrasting with 
the trend towards a more perfect form of federal integration4. In this light, the 
actual triggering of Article 50 TEU by a Member State would mean going back-
wards to a more imperfect form of cooperation between the Member States and 
would represent a setback in the process of integration. To a certain extent, the 
withdrawal provision, somehow echoing the subjection of EU law to International 
law, could be seen as a kind of “Trojan horse” holding the potential to, from the 
inside, put an end to the conquests of EU constitutionalism.
1 GoRdon, Michael, 2016, “Brexit: a Challenge for the UK Constitution, of the UK Constitution?”, in 
European Constitutional Law Review, 12, pp. 409-444, referring to Brexit as “the prompt for a potentially 
remarkable recalibration of the UK constitution which was neither expected nor prepared for”.
2 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
3 It is significant that Brexit has been referred to the “most selfish decision ever made since Winston 
Churchill saved Europe with the blood, sweat and tears of the English”, Speech by MEP Esteban González 
Pons before the European Parliament on the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome.
4 See e.g., Mesquita, Maria José Rangel, 2005, “Forças e fraquezas do Tratado que estabelece uma 
Constituição para a Europa: cinco breves tópicos de reflexão”, in O Direito, 137, IV-V, p. 820, speaking of 
a clear concession to intergovernmentalism and interstatehood.
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To this assumed conceptual nature of Article 50 TEU, one must add the 
symbolism Brexit necessarily entails. In fact, it is clear that withdrawal of the 
UK from the EU involves more than the loss of one Member State. The trust on 
an ever-growing project grounded on the so-called “spill-over” effect appears 
compromised. In what Europe enshrines of a never-ending process, of hope in a 
united Europe, and of an optimistic trust in the future, Brexit represents its lowest 
moment. This symbolic dimension is not legally irrelevant. On the contrary, it is 
emblematically mentioned in the Treaties pursuant to which the Member States, 
“in view of further steps to be taken in order to advance European integration”5 
solemnly established among themselves the European Union, “marking a new 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe”6.
Also, it is also unquestionable that Brexit puts us far from the precedents 
and of the so-called two-speed Europe that has served to limit the degree of 
participation of the UK in EU policies through opt outs, enhanced cooperation 
mechanisms and other ad hoc arrangements. On the one hand, Brexit does not 
involve a mere adjustment to the geographic scope of application of the Trea-
ties. Membership of the EU is inherently and definitely affected. Constitutional 
amendment will be necessary, notably to Articles 52 TEU and 355 TFEU, and 
Protocols no. 15, 20, 30 and 31, to name the most obvious provisions. On the 
other hand, although the framework of the future relations between the EU and 
the UK is yet to be determined, it is clear that whatever solution is reached, the 
UK will be excluded from the vast majority of the EU fields of action, and what is 
currently the exception will become the rule.
However, although it is clear that something has been lost along the way, 
it is important not to forget that the UK is leaving a constitutional polity. In this 
light, the purpose of this paper is to highlight the need to understand Brexit in the 
wider context of EU constitutionalism, by (i) demonstrating that withdrawal from 
federal organisations is not unprecedented, and does not necessarily reflect the 
intergovernmental nature of European integration, and by (ii) pointing out how 
exiting the EU may, on the contrary, contribute to reinforce the constitutional 
nature of the Union under whose lens it necessarily needs to be assessed and 
negotiated. 
5 See Preamble of the TEU.
6 Cf. Article 1 TEU. It is not a coincidence that one of david caMeRon’s demands on the eve of the Brexit 
referendum was the withdrawal by the UK of the expression “an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe”, enshrined in the Treaties.
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2. The Possibility of Leaving the EU: Before and After Article 
50 TEU
I. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in the absence of an ex-
press provision, it was not clear whether a Member State could withdraw from 
the Union7. In 1982, hill noted that several authorities adhered “to the view that 
the treaties establishing the European Communities have placed Europe in an 
irreversible process of European integration”8. This was consistent with the goal 
expressed in the Treaty’s preamble to strive for “an ever closer union among the 
European peoples”, which necessarily excluded the right of a Member State 
to withdraw. Also, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) stated in 
Costa9 that the States had created “a Community of unlimited duration”, limiting 
their sovereignty through a transfer of powers and establishing “an independent 
legal order”, thus suggesting that withdrawal was not legally possible.
However, several scholars noted that such possibility existed. Despite the 
constitutional nature of the EU and of its autonomous legal order, authors con-
sidered that there was a fundamental right to withdraw based either on the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 196910, either on customary 
international law11. In fact, the CJEU’s statements for in of themselves were not 
sufficient to exclude the right to withdraw from the EEC. It could be argued that 
Costa did not address the issue at all, as one thing is the duration of the Treaty 
(which in contrast, for instance, with the ECSC Treaty was and is still not pre-de-
termined), while another is the possibility of exiting the Community/Union, which 
would subsist if one of the States decided to leave. Thus, the unlimited duration 
of the Treaty would not preclude the possibility of terminating the project if the 
contracting parties so wished. Also, Costa dealt mostly with the principle of su-
premacy which in itself does not exhaust the constitutional difficulties involved 
in the European project. It is clear that the latter are not restricted to the legal 
relationship between national law and EU law, but go to the heart of sovereignty 
7 In Portugal, the issue has been addressed, a.o., by duaRte, Maria Luísa, 2005, Estudos de Direito da 
União e das Comunidades Europeias II, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora; Mesquita, Maria José Rangel, “Forças 
e fraquezas do Tratado que estabelece uma Constituição para a Europa”, pp. 807-836; patRão, Afonso, 
2010, “O Direito de abandonar a União Europeia à luz do Tratado de Lisboa: a extinção do direito de livre-
mente abandonar a União?”, in M. Costa Andrada, M. João Antunes and Susana A. Sousa (org.) Studia 
Juridica, Vol. IV, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, pp. 755-794.
8 hill, John, 1982, “The European Economic Community: the Right of Member State Withdrawal”, in 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 12, p. 338.
9 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, ECR 1964, p. 1195.
10 See e.g., patRão, Afonso, “O Direito de abandonar a União Europeia à luz do Tratado de Lisboa”, 
p. 782, basing the right to withdraw on Article 56(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.
11 See e.g., hill, John, The European Economic Community, pp. 344 seq.
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and the right to self-determination of the peoples of Europe (even if the scope of 
this right is controversial in of itself). 
In light of the above, no Member State protested against the UK right to 
withdraw when the Labour government was elected in 1974, with a manifesto 
to pledge to hold a referendum on the issue. Although the issue was not tested 
at the time, as a large majority voted in favour of staying in the EEC, it was as-
sumed that Britain could have left if she so wished12. 
In addition, it is customary to mention in this ambit the cases of Algeria, 
Greenland and Saint Barthélémy as precedents of withdrawing communities. 
Algeria left the EEC when it gained independence from France although with-
drawal did not result in any revision of France’s level of participation in the Com-
munities. Greenland left the EEC in the early 1980s, assuming the status of 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) list country, determining a change in 
the geographic scope of the Treaties but not in Denmark’s membership of the 
EU13. The same happened with Saint Barths when the island voted to secede 
from Guadeloupe, and the local government called on France to review the is-
land’s relationship with the EU. Saint Barthélémy became an OCT as of 2012.
Thus, before Article 50 TEU, although the issue was long discussed, there 
were sufficient bases to argue for the possibility of leaving the EU based either 
on history, legal arguments, political outcomes14, or mere factual considerations. 
douGan noted that “even though the current Treaties have been concluded for an 
indefinite period and contain no express provisions permitting a Member State 
to exit the Union, it is beyond doubt that – politically and legally – nothing can 
prevent a country from seceding should it wish to do so”15. In practice, the EU 
would hardly have ways to prevent withdrawal. Notwithstanding, there was also 
strong evidence suggesting that withdrawal would not be done in a legal vac-
cum and that it would have to be implemented in a negotiated manner16.
12 The UK threatened to leave the EU at least two times before. Additionally to the 1974 election, in 
1981, the Labour Party promised that if it was elected it would withdraw from the EEC without even holding 
a referendum.
13 See e.g., Weiss, Friedl, 1985, “Greenland’s withdrawal from the European Communities”, in European 
Law Review, 10(3), pp. 173-185. 
14 hill discussed the possibility of Germany exercising the right to withdraw which it had previously 
reserved in case of reunification and the hypothesis of a Member State turning into a form of communist 
government. See hill, John, The European Economic Community, p. 355.
15 douGan, Michael, 2008, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not Hearts”, in Common Market 
Law Review, 45(3), p. 668.
16 BeRGlunG, Sara, 2006, “Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of Withdrawal from the Euro-
pean Union”, in Scandinavian Political Studies, 29 (2), pp. 147-167.
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In light of the above, neither the inclusion of Article 50 in the TEU nor it’s 
triggering by the UK represent in of themselves a loss in the process of European 
integration. The possibility of exiting the Union had been on the table before, and 
had been politically discussed and partially implemented.
II. Commenting on Article 50 TEU on occasion of the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, allan tathaM suggested that it was best not to mention divorce 
at the wedding17. This may explain why the possibility of leaving the EU has 
only been introduced in the last amendment to the Treaties. Legal silence would 
discourage Member States to leave or even consider leaving the EU, in so far 
as the uncertainties surrounding the exiting process began with the discussion 
on its mere possibility. Sub silentio, it was arguable that Member States simply 
could not leave the EU.
Hence, the anxieties caused by the inclusion of a withdrawal mechanism in 
the Lisbon Treaty were only compensated by the conviction and sincere hope 
that said mechanism would never be used18. That conviction may also explain 
the incomplete nature of Article 50 TEU and the doubts surrounding its current 
application resulting therefrom. 
In any case, although it may be wise not to discuss separation when com-
mitting to a “happily-ever-after-union”, it is common that couples, as well as 
institutions, anticipate the possibility of things not working out as initially planned, 
thereby providing for exit solutions. That is, for instance, in the marital context, 
the role of prenuptial agreements in case of divorce. 
The legal basis for leaving the EU originates from the works of the Conven-
tion for the Future of Europe, which prepared the draft Constitutional Treaty (CT) 
later signed and at the end rejected by the States19. The provision was included 
in the CT in light of the fact that the UK disagreed with the political aspiration of 
a closer union that the CT set in motion20. Within the works of the Convention 
three basic models were discussed: 
17 tathaM, Allan F., 2012, “‘Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling’ EU Accession and Withdraw-
al after Lisbon”, in A. Biondi, O. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, New York, Oxford 
University Press, p. 128.
18 In Portugal, for instance, aFonso patRão, stated that it was not believable that a Member State would 
ever decide to withdraw from the EU considering the positive results achieved by European integration and 
the degree of economic, social and political inter-independence between the states meanwhile generated. 
See patRão, Afonso, “O Direito de abandonar a União Europeia à luz do Tratado de Lisboa”, p. 789.
19 It corresponded to Article 60-I of the CT.
20 See List of Proposed Amendments to the Text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe, “Part I of the Constitution: Article 59”, <http://europeanconvention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/
pdf/46/global46.pdf>.
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(i)  state primacy: where a Member State would have the absolute, uncondi-
tional and unilateral right to withdraw from the Union; 
(ii)  federal primacy: where there would be a prohibition of withdrawing based 
on the premise that once a Member State always a Member State; and, 
(iii)  federal control: where Member States would retain the sovereign right to 
leave the Union, but subject to negotiations and approval by the remain-
ing States. 
Article 50 TEU intends to reflect the latter option. Thus, pursuant to said 
provision any Member State may freely decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. A Member State which 
decides to withdraw must notify the European Council of its intention. The Eu-
ropean Council will then provide the guidelines that shall base the negotiations 
of the withdrawal agreement taking account of the framework for its future re-
lationship with the Union. Said agreement will be negotiated pursuant to Article 
218(3) TFEU and will be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council of the 
EU, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
Thus, although the triggering of Article 50 TEU is not dependent upon any 
substantive conditions for leaving the EU, it is subject to a strict procedure of 
negotiations involving both the states and the institutions21. Nonetheless, pur-
suant to Article 50(3) TEU, withdrawal will occur regardless of the existence 
of an agreement between the Union and the withdrawing state. Indeed, the 
Treaties shall cease to apply to the state in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the withdrawal 
notification, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period22.
III. Regardless of its obvious major political and legal impact, withdrawal 
from the Union tells us very little on the legal nature of the EU as a constitutional 
project. Even though the unilateral right of a Member State to withdraw is said 
to be typical of international treaties and not of state’s constitutions, there are in 
reality all sorts of solutions.
21 See also hoFMeisteR, Hannes, 2010, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?: A Critical Analysis of the Right 
to Withdraw from the EU”, in European Law Journal, 16(5), p. 592; Malathouni, Eliza, 2008, “Should I Stay 
or Should I go: The Sunset Clause as Self-Confidence or Suicide”, in Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 15, p. 115.
22 Criticizing the two-year period provided for in the Treaties see e.g., heRBst, Jochen, “Observations on 
the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaties’?”, in Dann P., Rynk-
owski M. (eds.) The Unity of the European Constitution. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und 
Völkerrecht, Vol. 186. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006, p. 1758.
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Hence, whereas for instance the Treaty establishing the League of Nations 
included the possibility of withdrawal, as happens also with the International 
Monetary Fund and the GATTs, the United Nations Charter does not include 
such possibility. On the other hand, it is true that usually state constitutions’ do 
not provide for exiting mechanisms. Hence, in the USA war was fought over the 
issue and the national constitution does not seem to allow for secession23. In 
Texas v White24, the US Supreme Court accepted the doctrine of a perpetual 
and indissoluble union between the states where there is no place for reconsid-
eration or revocation, except through revolution or consent25. Thus, in the USA, 
which paradoxically emerged from the “first formal secession proclamation in 
world history”26 – withdrawal does not seem to be realistic. More recently, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska considered secession to be clearly unconstitutional27.
In Spain, the unilateral secession of Catalonia was also considered to be 
unconstitutional on the basis of national sovereignty. The latter is said to lie ex-
clusively with the Spanish people: “unidad ideal de imputación del poder con-
stituyente y, como tal, fundamento dela Constitución y del Ordenamiento jurídico 
y origen de cualquier poder político”28. According to the Spanish Constitutional 
23 lincoln’s words in his message to Congress in July 4, 1861, are famous: “[a]nd this issue [the disso-
lution of the Union] embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of 
man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy a government of the people, by the same 
people can, or cannot, maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question 
whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administration according to organic law, 
in any case, can always… break up their Government, and thus practically put an end to free government 
upon the earth. It forces us to ask: ‘Is there, in all republics, this inherent, and fatal weakness?’ ‘Must a 
government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own 
existence?’”
24 Texas v White 74 US 700, 725. 
25 Hence, “[w]hen Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. 
The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the 
union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration or revocation, except through 
revolution or through consent of the States.”
26 Ryan, Erin, 2017, “Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Con-
flict in a Pluralist Society”, in Oregon Law Review, Vol. 96; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper 
No. 806, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775377, p. 8. It is also noticeable that at the 
subnational level, there are several examples of peaceful secession in the U.S.A., as happened for instance 
with the Carolinas and the Dakotas.
27 Scott Kohlhaas v. State of Alaska, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, No. S-11866, November 17, 
2006. Quoting Texas v. White, the Alaskan Supreme Court affirmed that “the act which consummated her 
admission to the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member 
into the political body” and “it was final”. As such, “when the forty-nine flag was first raised at Juneau, [the] 
Alaskans committed [themselves] to that indestructible Union for good or ill, in perpetuity. To suggest oth-
erwise would ‘disparage the republican character of the National Government’”.
28 Author’s translation: “ideal unity to which the constituent power is imputable, and therefore the foun-
dation of the Constitution and of the Legal Order and origin of any political power”. See Spanish Constitu-
tional Court Decision no. 42/2014, 25th March 2014, available here: http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/
Resolucion/Show/23861.
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Court, under the current constitutional arrangements only the Spanish people 
is sovereign, and it is so in an exclusive and indivisible manner, so that no frac-
tion of the people can claim said quality and have the right to break what the 
constitution considers “la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española”29. Notwith-
standing, the Court acknowledged Catalonia’s constitutional right to decide its 
own fate (“derecho a decidir de los ciudadanos de Cataluña”). However, such 
right is not considered to be a manifestation of self-determination or regional 
sovereignty, but a political aspiration, in so far as it is exercised in a manner con-
sistent with the national constitution, with respect to the principles of democracy, 
pluralism, legality, transparency, Europeism, the role of Parliament, participation 
and dialogue. 
Curiously, the Spanish Constitutional Court considered that its verdict was 
similar to the one reached by the Canadian Supreme Court in its ruling of 1998 
on the secession of Québec30, although both courts in reality came to different 
decisions. In fact, the Canadian Supreme Court has accepted that secession 
from the federal Union corresponds to an inherent right of the states, founded 
on the principle of democracy31. However, as the Court pointed out, democracy 
“means more than simple majority rule” as it “exists in the larger context of other 
constitutional values”32. In the Canadian experience, those values include federal-
ism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. 
A democratic decision of Quebecers in favour of secession would necessarily 
put those relationships at risk. Thus, as the Constitution vouchsafes order and 
stability, secession of a province “under the Constitution” could not be achieved 
unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in the 
Confederation within the existing constitutional framework. In this light, the Court 
considered that Québec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to 
invoke a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession 
to the other parties to the federation. “Democratic rights under the Constitution 
cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations”33. On the one hand, “the 
continued existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order could 
29 Author’s translation: “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”. As a consequence, a regional 
community cannot unilaterally initiate a referendum to decide its integration in Spain.
30 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
31 Following the Supreme Court’s Decision, the Parliament of Canada passed the Clarity Act (Loi sur la 
clarté référendaire) establishing the conditions under which the Government of Canada would enter into 
negotiations that might lead to secession following such a vote by one of the provinces. Two days after 
the Clarity Act had been introduced in the Canadian House of Commons, the Parti Québécois government 
passed an Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people 
and the Québec State in the National Assembly of Québec. 
32 Para. 149.
33 Para. 151.
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not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they 
no longer wish to remain in Canada”34. Therefore, the other provinces and the 
federal government would have no basis to deny the right of the government of 
Québec to pursue secession. However, on the other hand, that would be so true 
only if, so long as in doing so, Québec respects the rights of others35.
In light of the above, it becomes clear that the possibility to withdraw is 
neither typical of nor limited to intergovernmental organisations and does not 
necessarily compromise federalism or constitutionalism. In particular, the Cana-
dian experience makes clear that withdrawal from a constitutional polity can be 
pursued within the framework of its constitutional values and principles. 
Hence, it is submitted that Article 50 TEU in itself does not threaten the con-
stitutional nature of the European legal order. Things go the other way around: 
withdrawal from the EU must be understood against the backdrop of EU consti-
tutionalism. This means that, from a conceptual point of view, withdrawal from 
the EU cannot be assessed under the lens of intergovernmental cooperation, 
calling for the application of International law rules and principles. On the con-
trary, leaving the EU needs to be assessed and negotiated from the standpoint 
of European constitutionalism, with respect to the core values on which the EU 
is based. In this conception, the key to understanding and implementing Brexit 
lies not in Costa but in Les Verts36, where the CJEU firstly acknowledged the 
European Treaties as the constitutional charter of a Community/Union based on 
the rule of law.
3. EU Constitutionalism After Brexit
Hence, although it does not amount to a typical example of secession – 
in the sense that secession involves the effort of group or section of a state 
with a view to achieving statehood on the international plane – Brexit cannot 
be discussed from the perspective of International law but of constitutional law. 
It would be a serious misapprehension of the European project to discuss the 
details of withdrawal from the standpoint of International law. Leaving the EU is 
not merely ceasing a classical form of international cooperation. Withdrawal from 
the EU must be grasped and implemented in the framework of the constitutional 
34 Para. 151.
35 Para. 151. The Court acknowledges that the negotiations that followed a vote to withdraw would 
have to address the potential act of secession as well as its possible terms. They would need to address 
the interests of the other provinces, the federal government, Québec and indeed the rights of all Canadians 
both within and outside Québec, and specifically the rights of minorities. Cf. para. 152 seq.
36 Case 294/83, Les Verts/Parliament, ECR 1986, p. 1339.
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compound that binds the States to each other and to the Union, and of the du-
ties Member States undertook when they accepted to be part of a EU based on 
the rule of law. In this sense, Brexit is as much a challenge to the UK constitution 
as it is to the European one. 
The consequences of this view are twofold. On the one hand, EU funda-
mental principles and values must guide withdrawing negotiations. On the other 
hand, they must be fully respected in the course of the withdrawing process. 
Said fundamental principles and values stem clearly from the wording of the 
Treaties. At the outset, Article 2 TEU mentions the values of respect for hu-
man dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for hu-
man rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are said to be common to the Member States in “a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail”. Taking into account the constitutional experience of the EU, 
it is possible to try to assess some of the legal and political implications of the 
above mentioned principles in the context of Brexit negotiations.
Freedom, Democracy and Equality. To begin with, the possibility of exiting 
the EU tests the essence of self-government which is at the core of European 
liberal democracies. The discussion on whether the decision to leave the Union 
can be justified on the grounds of the right to self-determination under Interna-
tional law is, in this context, futile. Membership of a project founded on democ-
racy must entail the acknowledgement of the possibility to leave. In its deepest 
routes, democracy lies with the freedom of choice, and thus the freedom to 
join and the freedom to leave. Article 50 TEU must be interpreted against this 
background.
Also, in its core, democracy means consent by majoritarian decision-mak-
ing. To a certain extent, this principle is reflected on Article 50 TEU pursuant to 
which the Council of the EU decides by qualified majority. Notwithstanding, more 
importantly, understanding withdrawal through the lens of democracy means 
accepting that negotiations must account for the interests of the 28th democrat-
ic majorities in the EU. The withdrawing process involves in reality a multilateral 
negotiation. Although Article 50 TEU provides for the Council of the EU and 
Commission to be the frontrunners of the negotiations, it is important not to lose 
sight that there are 28th democratic majorities whose interests must be taken 
into consideration in the process.
Democracy also means the need for debate and deliberation and conse-
quently the duty to engage in constructive discussions to address the concerns 
of dissenting voices. The duty to negotiate is also a consequence of the degree 
of interdependence between the States resulting from participation in the EU. 
In this light, it is clear that exit conditions cannot be unilaterally dictated by the 
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withdrawing state. It is noticeable that in the prior case of Greenland, Denmark 
did not attempt at a unilateral withdrawal, but looked rather for a negotiated 
way-out. Thus, without surprise, Article 50 TEU provides that the Union shall 
conclude an agreement with the withdrawing State which must be negotiated 
pursuant to the common Treaty provisions. 
Also, it is unquestionable that negotiations must be carried out in good faith. 
This obligation is enshrined in the Treaties, flowing from the well-known princi-
ple of loyal cooperation. In particular, the second paragraph of Article 4(3) TEU 
provides that Member States are under the obligation “to take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union”. These 
constitutional obligations go well beyond the general duties of good faith im-
posed on states when negotiating or withdrawing from international treaties, 
notably under Articles 18 or 65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties. In this respect, the CJEU has expanded significantly the scope of the 
obligations resulting from the principle of loyal cooperation, and has not hesitat-
ed to intervene when such a breach was found to have been committed either 
by the States or the EU institutions37. 
Additionally, although democracy also helps to explain why the seceding 
state MEPs’ may still take part in the deliberation regarding withdrawal38, the 
solution regarding the state’s representative in the Council of the EU may be 
more difficult to understand39. In fact, pursuant to Article 50 TEU, with the ex-
ception of the withdrawing decision, the withdrawing state representative in the 
Council of the EU continues to participate in the Council’s meetings, discussions 
and decisions. This solution may create disruptions with regard to the adoption 
of legal acts and their respective financial consequences destined to produce ef-
fect after Brexit is fully implemented. Democracy demands cautious in the scope 
of participation of the UK ministers in the Council of the EU and in the exercise of 
the right to vote in decisions which will not be applicable to the UK in due time.
Lastly, the possibility of revocation of Brexit must also be assessed under 
the principles of freedom, democracy and equality between the States. On the 
one hand, if Member States are committed to integration, the group of the 27 
37 See e.g., Case C-246/07 Commission/Sweden (PFOS), ECR 2010 p. I-3317.
38 douGan is critical of this solution, arguing that once a Member State has exercised its unilateral and 
unconditional right to withdraw from the Union, “there is no good reason to offer its MEPs the right to 
exercise any influence (yet alone a potentially decisive one) over the agreement which will determine the 
future relations between that country and the Union”. See douGan, Michael, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007”, 
p. 688. We respectfully disagree. Also with regard to the judges of the CJEU it seems clear that they should 
maintain their positions until withdrawal effectively occurs. 
39 See FRiel, Raymond Y., 2004, “Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Ar-
ticle 59 of the Draft European Constitution”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53(2), p. 426.
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must accept the possibility of the UK to revoke its decision to withdraw40. On 
the other hand, if the UK revokes its withdrawal decision it must be prepared to 
accept the consequences resulting from the frustration of expectations created 
on both the other States and on the EU institutions, and its possible impact on 
non-withdrawal conditions41.
Rule of law and fundamental rights. It has been noted that Article 50 TEU 
does not in itself render fundamental rights applicable as a matter of EU law 
nugatory during the process of removal from the EU42. On the contrary, EU con-
stitutionalism requires that priority is given to the rights of EU citizens during and 
after Brexit. Without surprise, from the very beginning, the European Council 
guidelines prioritized the issue43. The need to provide as much clarity and legal 
certainty as possible to citizens is also reflected in the Council of the EU and 
Commission’s documents on Brexit44. Indeed, the rule of law imposes that dis-
entanglement of a Member State from the Union is not done in a scenario of 
chaos or anarchy, which lincoln in his time considered as inevitable45. Thus, all 
European institutions have consistently called for an “orderly withdrawal” of the 
UK from the EU. In this ambit, the Commission has proposed to prolong the 
status of EU citizenship for those who have shaped their lives under EU law. This 
entails protecting living EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU at several 
levels as if Brexit would not take place46. 
40 See also eeckhout, Piet, FRantziou, Eleni, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading” 
(December 23, 2016), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2889254, p. 41, considering that uni-
lateral revocation of the decision to withdraw should be possible provided that it is done in good faith.
41 See saRi, Aurel, “Biting the Bullet: Why the UK is Free to Revoke its Withdrawal Notification under 
Article 50 TEU”, available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/17/aurel-sari-biting-the-bullet-why-
the-uk-is-free-to-revoke-its-withdrawal-notification-under-article-50-teu/.
42 See eeckhout, Piet, FRantziou, eleni, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU”, p. 21.
43 The European Council noted that “[t]he right for every EU citizen, and of his or her family members, 
to live, to work or to study in any EU Member State is a fundamental aspect of the European Union. Along 
with other rights provided under EU law, it has shaped the lives and choices of millions of people. Agreeing 
reciprocal guarantees to safeguard the status and rights derived from EU law at the date of withdrawal of 
EU and UK citizens, and their families, affected by the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union will be 
the first priority for the negotiations. Such guarantees must be effective, enforceable, non-discriminatory 
and comprehensive, including the right to acquire permanent residence after a continuous period of five 
years of legal residence. Citizens should be able to exercise their rights through smooth and simple admin-
istrative procedures.” See European Council (Art. 50) guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification 
under Article 50 TEU.
44 All available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-arti-
cle-50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en.
45 In his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861 Lincoln affirmed that “[p]lainly, the central idea of 
secession is the essence of anarchy”.
46 See e.g., Working paper “Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights”, TF50 (2017) 1 Commission to 
EU27; Position paper on “Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights”, TF50 (2017) 1/2 – Commission to UK.
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The obligation to respect individual rights applies to the UK as well. It is sig-
nificant that before the official notification to the EU, the House of Lords urged 
the UK government to proceed with a unilateral guarantee of the rights of EU 
citizens in the UK. 
It must be highlighted that even where fundamental rights are not at stake, 
any arbitrary form of regression of any vested rights can be “constitutionally 
destabilising, to the extent that they are prejudicial to the principles of legal cer-
tainty and legitimate expectations”47. These principles are part of the EU consti-
tutional order, and they entail important consequences at the level of publication 
of the results of the negotiations, adequate notice periods to those who may be 
individually affected48, and more importantly the adoption of provisional rules and 
transitional periods49. 
Lastly, the loss of EU citizenship of UK citizens deserves some considera-
tion, especially with regard to those citizens who have not consented to it. It is 
settled EU law that citizenship of the Union tends to be the “fundamental status” 
of nationals of the Member States50. The CJEU considers that “by reason of its 
nature and consequences” the loss of EU citizenship falls within the jurisdiction 
of the CJEU51. According to the Court, even though EU law does not compro-
mise the principle of International law pursuant to which acquisition and loss 
of nationality is a matter of national competence, the exercise of that power in 
respect to citizens of the Union is amenable to judicial review under EU law. In 
particular, “having regard to the importance which primary law attaches to the 
status of citizen of the Union”, a decision to withdraw naturalisation “must take 
into account the consequences that the decision entails for the person con-
cerned and, if relevant, for the members of his family with regard to the loss of 
the rights enjoyed by every citizen of the Union”52. In light of this case-law, and 
despite of being a necessary consequence of withdrawal, it is clear that the 
legality of the process of losing EU citizenship triggers EU constitutional guaran-
tees and may merit oversight by domestic courts and the CJEU itself. 
Separation of Powers and Federalism. Separation of powers in the EU ma-
terializes at different levels. At the outset there is a division of competences 
between the States and the Union based on the principle of conferral. The latter 
constitutes the essence of federalist systems aimed at accommodating diversity 
47 eeckhout, Piet, FRantziou, Eleni, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU”, p. 20.
48 Ibidem.
49 In this respect, it is interesting to note that in the period post-independence, EEC Law continued to 
apply temporarily in Algeria.
50 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECR 2001, I-6193, para. 31.
51 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, ECR 2010, p. I-1449, para. 42.
52 Para. 56.
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in unity. In this ambit, it is important to recall that EU federalism is not merely 
designed to protect and accommodate local cultures and traditions, or auton-
omous decision making by local communities. EU federalism accounts for na-
tional identities reflected in the constitutional structures of each Member State53. 
This protection ranges to the nuclear identity of the European peoples and the 
way the latter conceive themselves vis-à-vis the other groups and communities. 
This finding entails a two-sided consequence. On the one hand, withdrawal from 
the Union cannot ignore the constitutional difficulties and concerns of the with-
drawing state. On the other hand, constitutional requirements of the remaining 
Member States may have to be accounted for in the withdrawing process. This 
means that negotiations may lead to different solutions regarding concrete Mem-
ber States, with Ireland, Spain and Cyprus being the most obvious candidates.
EU federalism and the principle of conferral are also key to understanding 
the legal consequences surrounding the adoption of the agreement governing 
the future UK-EU relations. It is common for international agreements concluded 
by the EU to have more than one provision in the EU Treaties as their legal basis, 
depending on their scope and object. Thus, for instance, if the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU is confined to trade matters, Article 207 TFEU will 
constitute the relevant provision. If, however, the future relationship includes a 
range of EU policies, the conclusion of an association agreement under Article 
217 TFEU may have to be considered. In this context, eeckhout and FRantziou 
have noted that there seems not to be any compelling legal reasons for requiring 
the UK to withdraw from the EU first, before negotiating a new agreement on its 
future relationship54.
Also in this respect, it is unclear whether the future relationship between the 
EU and the UK requires the conclusion of a mixed agreement, i.e. an interna-
tional agreement concluded by the EU and its Member States. If it is clear that 
regarding withdrawal the Member States have conferred their powers exclusive-
ly to the EU, it is unclear whether they have done so with regard to their future 
relationship with the exiting state55.
Additionally, separation of powers in the EU federal system also occurs at 
the level of EU institutions. In fact, the Treaties “set up a system for distributing 
powers among the different [Union] institutions, assigning to each institution its 
53 Cf. Article 4(2) TEU.
54 See eeckhout, Piet, FRantziou, Eleni, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU”, p. 25.
55 See also eeckhout, Piet, FRantziou, Eleni, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU”, p. 25. It should be noted that, in 
the past, Greenland’s withdrawal was combined with the introduction of new arrangements that allowed for 
the maintenance of close and lasting links between the EU and Greenland. The Greenland Treaty, signed 
in Brussels on 13 March 1984, was concluded by the Member States of the EU as it consisted of a Treaty 
amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities. 
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own role in the institutional structure of the [Union] and the accomplishment of 
the tasks entrusted to the [Union]”56. In this ambit, the CJEU has clarified that the 
EU institutions are bound by the so-called principle of the institutional balance 
which “means that each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due 
regard for the powers of the other institutions” and requires “that it should be 
possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur”57. Therefore, it is 
pivotal that the each EU institution is aware of the interests it represents and its 
role vis-à-vis the other institutions. The need to comply with this principle may 
explain why in the case of Greenland, the Council of the EU sought the opinion 
of Parliament, although it was not obliged to do so. In the current context, the 
solutions provided for in Article 50 TEU may leave room for doubts in the course 
of withdrawing negotiations. The multiplication of the number of actors leading 
the withdrawal process may bolster conflicts over the pace and contents of the 
negotiations, and it is not to be excluded that the institutions come to a point 
where they do not see eye to eye with regard to every withdrawal detail. 
Likewise, understanding the EU as a federal project may contribute to solve 
one of the most difficult issues surrounding the exiting process, i.e., the financial 
settlement. At this point it is yet unclear whether the UK must continue to pay 
contributions to the EU budget or reimburse monies to the Union. It is submitted 
that the solutions to the institutional and budgetary issues surrounding with-
drawal should be grasped under the lens of EU federalism, notably by taking into 
consideration both the degree of mutual trust and interdependence created by 
European integration and the burden sharing inherent to EU membership.
Justiciability and the role of the CJEU. It is not to be excluded that the CJEU 
comes to be involved in the withdrawing process. In so far as it implies the con-
clusion of international agreement(s) (either the withdrawal agreement and the 
agreement governing the future UK-EU relations, or a combination of both), the 
Court may be called to issue an opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU. It can-
not also be left out that, during or after Brexit, either an action for infringement or 
an action for annulment is brought before the CJEU regarding the legality of the 
negotiation decisions. With regard to the role of courts in respect of secession, 
the Canadian Supreme Court adopted a conservative approach. Considering 
that the content and process of the negotiations would be essentially for the 
political actors to settle, the Supreme Court considered that “the reconciliation of 
the various legitimate constitutional interests [would be] necessarily committed 
56 Case 70/88, Parliament/Council, ECR 1990, p. I-2041, para. 21.
57 The CJEU added: “[t]he Court, which under the Treaties has the task of ensuring that in the interpreta-
tion and application of the Treaties the law is observed, must therefore be able to maintain the institutional 
balance and, consequently, review the observance of the Parliament’s prerogatives when called upon to 
do so by the Parliament, by means of a legal remedy which is suited to the purpose which the Parliament 
seeks to achieve”. See Case 70/88, Parliament/Council, ECR 1990 p. I-2041, para. 23.
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to the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because that reconciliation 
[could] only be achieved through the give and take the negotiation process”58. 
Hence, echoing a type of “political-questions doctrine”, the Supreme Court in 
Canada considered that to the extent that issues addressed in the course of 
negotiations “are political in nature, it is not the role of the judiciary to interpose 
its own views on the different negotiating positions of the parties”59. Although 
judicial self-restraint is not unknown to the CJEU – which very often applies the 
so-called margin of appreciation doctrine – there are other instances where the 
Court has not hesitated to oversee the legality of delicate political matters60. As 
such, Brexit may also pose a challenge to the CJEU providing it with yet another 
opportunity to rethink its role and position as an adjudicator in EU politics. 
4. Concluding Remarks
If there were doubts surrounding the possibility of a Member State leaving 
the EU, they have been addressed by the inclusion of Article 50 TEU in the 
Treaties. Also, if there were doubts on the likelihood of a Member State actually 
leaving the EU they were solved by the decision of the British people to do so, 
and the subsequent triggering of said provision. 
The importance of the UK leaving the EU must not be underestimated. In its 
“White paper on the Future of Europe” the European Commission has recently 
referred to it as one of the greatest challenges Europe is currently facing, to-
gether with the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorist attacks and the 
emergence of new global powers61. At the institutional level, Brexit is without any 
doubt “the most delicate of European projects”62, and it is evident that it will en-
tail significant consequences at multiple levels. Some of them have already been 
anticipated and are mentioned in the documents which for the moment serve as 
basis for the negotiations. In any case, much more will appear and many unfore-
seeable questions will arise.
So far, the legal debate on Brexit has focused mostly on what constitutes 
a valid triggering decision for purposes of Article 50 TEU, in particular in light of 
the internal difficulties posed by parliamentary sovereignty v. prerogative powers 
58 Para. 101.
59 Para. 101.
60 The issue has been discussed in several cases. See e.g., the Opinions of the Advocates-General in 
Case C-120/94, Commission/Hellenic Republic, [1996] ECR I-1513 and Joined Cases C-402 and-415/05 
P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation/Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-6351.
61 White paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, p. 6.
62 GoRdon, Michael, “Brexit: a challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?”, p. 410.
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within the UK’s constitutional legal order63. In this respect, it has been defended 
that Brexit should not cause one to reject the UK’s political constitutionalist mod-
el and that one must look within the UK constitution for solutions64. 
The same thing could be said with regard to EU constitutionalism. In fact, 
Article 50 TEU raises equally important constitutional concerns for the EU legal 
order and its constitutional identity. The argument underlying this paper is the 
following: withdrawal from the EU cannot be interpreted from the perspective 
of International law thus entailing a setback in EU integration; it must be under-
stood and executed against the backdrop of EU constitutional principles. Brexit 
brought to light what was already fairly clear: that the EU is not destined to be 
“one Union, under god, indivisible”. The EU can be reverted and it is unclear 
whether it will endure as the institutional setting of the “organized world of tomor-
row”65. Therefore, withdrawal from the EU must be seen not only as a practical 
solution for democratic challenges but also as an opportunity to test and apply 
what the EU taught Europeans best: democracy and the rule of law. As a conse-
quence, even though the concrete contents of the negotiations are for political 
actors to define, the exit procedure, the conduct of the parties therein and the 
material outcomes must respect the core principles on which the EU is based.
“Things we lost in the fire” is a fairly well-known Hollywood movie from 2007 
that contrary to what the title suggests is not about depression and loss, but 
about coping and surviving in the face of tragedy and the things that matter 
most in life. This is precisely the way Brexit should be faced: with the focus not 
on what we have lost with the unwanted triggering of Article 50 TEU, but on what 
we have learnt and construed as Europeans for the last 60 years. As the Europe-
an Commission has put it, “the Union has often been built on the back of crises 
and false starts” and “has always been at a crossroads and has always adapted 
and evolved”66. Already in his memoirs, Jean Monnet wrote that the roots of the 
Community were “strong” and “deep in the soil of Europe. They have survived 
some hard seasons, and can survive more”67. The withdrawal of the UK from the 
EU is one more of those seasons, and yet another opportunity, certainly an his-
torical one, “to renew our vows”68, holding fast “to the fixed principles that have 
guided us since the beginning”69.
63 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
64 GoRdon, Michael, “Brexit: a challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?”, p. 444.
65 Monnet, Jean, Memoirs, Doubleday&Company Inc., Garden City, New York, 1978, p. 524.
66 White paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, p. 6.
67 Monnet, Jean, Memoirs, p. 523.
68 White paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, p. 26.
69 Monnet, Jean, Memoirs, p. 523.
